As globalisation progresses, cross-border movements of people are becoming dynamic and multilateral. The existence of different groups and minorities within the community renders the society multiethnic and multicultural. As individuals acquire new affiliation and belonging, the conventional conflict of laws methods may no longer be viable and should be subject to a thorough re-examination. Against this background, this paper analyses appropriate conflicts rules in international family relations to reflect an individual's identity. Furthermore, in light of the contemporary law fragmentation, this study also analyses interactions between state law and non-state cultural, religious or customary norms.
Introduction
As globalisation progresses, cross-border movements of people are becoming frequent, dynamic and multilateral. Immigrants from other regions or continents now render the vast majority of societies on the globe multiethnic and multicultural. 1 The existence of various groups and minority communities with divergent ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds entails an inherent risk of compromising social cohesion. 2 Especially in Europe, discordant moral concepts and legal institutions aroused by Muslim immigrants result in 'conflicts of cultures '. 3 It is, therefore, a crucial question how best to accommodate cultural diversity and pluralism while upholding social order and fundamental values in the recipient society.
The conventional method of conflict of laws, which goes back to Savigny in the mid-nineteenth century, 4 consists in pointing to the law that has the closest connection with the legal relationship concerned. This method focused on localising the legal relationship, departing from the territoriality of legal systems grounded in positive state law. 5 However, the drawbacks and limitations of this method are gradually coming to light in view of the contemporary dynamic diversification of societies and cultures. Once individuals acquire a new, alternative affiliation or belonging, 6 the viability of conventional connecting factors needs to be re-examined. Furthermore, the increasing importance of religious or customary norms leads to a query as to whether and how far non-state norms interact with state law and should be considered or respected in regulating crossborder family relations. 7 This paper examines from a viewpoint of global governance how conflict of laws should deal with crossborder family relations. It analyses possible solutions grounded on the effectivity of rules, rather than abstract territorial proximity to the legal relationship, 8 seeking a balance between state regulation and individual freedom. While the hegemony of sovereign states is gradually decreasing in globalisation in general, state governance has not lost its primordial importance in cross-border family relations in terms of upholding social order and protecting vulnerable parties through mandatory rules. Against this background, the paper first sheds light on contemporary discussions on the appropriateness of the principle of nationality or the principle of habitual residence in determining personal law. The study particularly contemplates how best to ascertain the law governing international family relations from the perspective of individual identity. Second, in view of cultural diversity and the multiplication of legal sources, the interactions between state law and non-state law and their possible accommodation in conflict of laws will be expounded on the basis of several examples. The results of this study will be summarised in conclusion. will best accommodate their family relations, 15 even if states reserve the authority to exceptionally intervene on the grounds of public policy and human rights. 16 In terms of conflict of laws methods, US revolutionary theories grounded in the state's authority pursuant to governmental interests, 17 substantive better law 18 or contingent lex fori 19 are not suited to achieving this objective. Rather, the point of departure needs to be the legal relationship concerned. An individual's identity is conceived subjectively. According to Taylor, the consciousness of self presupposes the existence of others and is established through interactions with them. By finding commonalities or differences, an individual obtains the sense of belonging to a certain collectivity with others. 20 The relevant factors may be ethnicity, nationality, gender, language, religion, customs or any other element. 21 The collectivity to which the individual belongs, therefore, is not only the state but can also comprise an ethnic minority, religious community, professional group, association or any other category including abstract ones. 22 By nature, an individual's identities are necessarily relative and multiple. Since every person initially acquires their identities by birth, forms self-consciousness and develops personality later, identities cannot be fixed, but may alter subsequently and dynamically. 23 In this respect, Huntington's thesis of the 'clash of civilizations' 24 was inappropriately grounded in an abstract, collective notion of civilisation and enclosed individuals in firm, inert categories. The limitations of his doctrine consisted in the fact that he disregarded individuals' differences and the possibility of their dynamic developments. 25
Principle of Nationality
How should we then select the law that mirrors the person's identities? In the nineteenth century, the principle of nationality was first adopted in France (1804) 26 and Austria (1811). 27 It was bilateralised and theoretically refined in Italy (1865) under the auspices of Mancini, 28 and spread to other civil law countries such as Germany (1896), 29 Belgium, 30 Turkey, 31 and Japan (1898), 32 as well as some Latin American countries. 33 The newly-established nation states of the time had obvious interests in emancipating the concept of nationality from its feudal fetters in order to define the membership and place their citizens under direct control, eliminating intermediate collectivities. 34 Regulating citizens' family relations even after emigration had the advantage for nation states of upholding their national integrity. 35 Presuming that each individual is inscribed of characteristics of the nation to which he or she belongs and has the consciousness of nationality, Mancini asserted that family relations should be governed by the law of the person's nationality. He held that sovereign states were obliged to reciprocate by respecting the rights of individuals belonging to other states, and therefore need to apply cial for the Japanese government to avoid being criticised for assimilation policies. 43 In their most recent legislations on private international law, Japan (2006), 44 the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (2001) 45 and the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2010) 46 have all upheld the principle of nationality and presumably will adhere to it. In these countries, consensual divorce, simple adoption and other status acts are effected by declaration at a family registration office which is bereft of substantive control, so that the connecting factor needs to be as ascertainable, precise and stable as nationality. 47 Furthermore, the nationality of these countries can generally be assumed to be effective under the jus sanguinis principle as well as the traditional sole nationality principle. 48 These countries have divergent cultural backgrounds and family institutions on the basis of a distinctive concept of consanguinity. 49 Because the number of foreign residents is still limited, multiculturalism has not yet been established in these countries. 50 to move to the principle of habitual residence in its recent legislation of 2010. 52 Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of global governance, it is significant that the meaning of nationality is gradually changing in other parts of the world. The traditional notion of nationality is geared toward nation-state membership. Miller contends that national identity is supported by the beliefs and common history of the community, based on dynamic political participation and territorial collectivity sharing distinctive characteristics. 53 The nationhood as an ideal and normative collectivity has been defined contrastingly among states, i.e., on the basis of consanguinity in Germany and Japan, 54 territorial community in France 55 and eternal allegiance to the Crown in the U.K. 56 These differences were traditionally reflected in the respective nationality legislation in relation to the conditions of acquisition of nationality by birth (jus sanguinis and jus soli, either in combination or as alternatives), status acts and naturalisation, because nationality legislation is governed by autonomy of the state in public international law and EU law. The sole nationality principle used to be predominant, so each individual could be defined by his or her belonging to a nation state. 57 Since the 1970s, however, dual nationality started to be accepted in various countries in an attempt to attain gender equality and uphold ties with outbound migrants for economic and sociopolitical reasons. 58 decision-making process of the state. 68 In this respect, the so-called democracy argument in conflict of laws to justify the application of the law of nationality, on the ground that individuals have the right to political participation and can select and influence the legislators in their home country, 69 may provide legitimacy, but remains all the more fictitious. As Batiffol rightly points out, law is primarily enacted for collectivity, not for individuals. 70 71 In fact, quite a few Muslim women voluntarily start wearing a headscarf in Europe to insinuate their identity, even if they had refused to do so in their country of origin. 72 In these cases, the application of the law of nationality will be justified as respecting the individual's identity, conventional values and moral concepts. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily apply to second or third generation immigrants, who are more responsive to the culture, customs, traditions and fundamental values of the receiving country than first generation immigrants. The younger generations may well have developed their identity to be integrated into the host society. People with immigration background could also be bicultural, i.e., socially and culturally belonging both to the country of origin and the country of residence. 73 As mentioned above, nationality constitutes only a part of multiple and multi-faceted individual identities. Nationality therefore cannot be the sole, categorical criteria for defining the person's affiliation and belonging. 74 As Mansel puts it, it is only in ideal-typical cases 75 that a person's identity is reflected in their nationality. 76 Otherwise, the law of nationality fails to materialise individual identity, which is particularly the 77 The same is true when the person is not aware of the content of the law of nationality due to its frequent reforms, as is the case with recent legislations in European countries. 78 
Principle of Habitual Residence
In the discussions on the determination of personal law in Europe, the principle of nationality has been subject to severe criticism since the 1950s. 79 Nationality as a public law notion was held unsuitable for determining the law governing cross-border family relations, whereas habitual residence -as the person's centre of life -was considered to have a substantial connection with the person and reflect his or her social environment. Moreover, nationality has institutional drawbacks as a connecting factor and needs to be supplemented by habitual residence (or any other factor) in the event of dual nationality, statelessness or refugee status. Nor can nationality serve as a connecting factor in the case of spouses of different nationality when the method of cascading connecting factors is employed with a view to achieving gender equality. 80 The Hague Conventions notably established the principle of habitual residence, inter alia, in relation to child abduction and adoption, protection of children or adults, as well as maintenance obligations. 81 They primarily envisage realising effective protection and implementing necessary measures in light of the best interests of the child and human rights. 82 While the policy of these Hague Conventions could be understood as designating territorial law that reflects the conditions of social environment instead of personal law governing internal family relations, 83 the extension of the scope of application of habitual residence is obvious in the EU, 84 particularly in relation to the Maintenance Regulation, 85 the Rome III Regulation 86 and the Succession Regulation, 87 besides the Proposal for a Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes. 88 The EU is seeking to constitute a uniform area of justice. Geared toward policy considerations, 89 the EU opts for habitual residence with a view to its coincidence with jurisdiction under the Brussels II bis Regulation 90 and other relevant EU Regulations 91 or domestic rules. The application of lex fori will ensure the ascertainability of applicable law and therefore the quality and expeditiousness of court proceedings. 92 Also because people generally possess assets at their habitual residence, it is a particularly expedient connecting factor for succession and matrimonial property regimes. 93 Furthermore, the principle of habitual residence has the advantage of subjecting all inhabitants to the same law, so it can guarantee equal treatment for both EU citizens and immigrants. 94 In fact, by regulating the family relations of all inhabitants pursuant to its own law, the host state is able to enhance social integration and shun creating parallel societies. 95 104 cannot assist in resolving this impasse, as it only grants priority to one of the objective connecting factors in an abstract way. Nor can the principle of recognition in the EU bridge this schism, as it simply requests, like the vested rights theory, 105 the recognition of a person's name (or status) established in one of the EU member states as such without inquiring which law was applied. 106 The conflicts rules of the first member state, in which the legal situation has been constituted, remain intact and prevail over those of the recognising member state. The only question that matters is to decide in which member state to create the legal situation first. 107 With frequent cross-border movement of persons and the accompanying exchange of values, the inherent bond between individual identity, cultures and territory is gradually weakening nowadays. 108 The proper law of an individual or family 109 can hardly be sought solely by means of objective territorial links. Rather, personal connection, which is best defined by the person himself or herself, should be the controlling factor in determining the applicable law, as private actors are most affected in cross-border family relations. Considering that individual identity is conceived subjectively, it would be consistent and reasonable to allow the parties to select the law governing family relations themselves. By virtue of party autonomy, albeit the law of habitual residence is objectively applicable, the parties can substitute it by the law of nationality when they have a closer tie with their country of origin. Conversely, even if nationality is the primary objective connecting factor, the parties can refer to the law of habitual residence instead when they are integrated in the host society where they reside. Korean immigrants in Japan whose forebears had settled in Japan during the colonial period are a good illustration of this latter case. Today, secondand third-generation Korean immigrants regularly uphold family ties in North or South Korea but are socially integrated into and culturally adapted to Japan due to their permanent centre of life in that recipient country. The optional application of the law of habitual residence instead of that of nationality enables them to constitute their family relations in conformity with their primary identity. 110 Arguably, the dichotomy between nationality and habitual residence will be appropriately overcome by employing the method of the parties' choice of law. 111 Indeed, party autonomy will render nationality and habitual residence complementary connecting factors, rather than mutually inconsistent criteria for determining personal law that hamper international harmony of decisions. 112
Party Autonomy in Family Relations
Apart from respecting individual identity, party autonomy has the advantage of ensuring flexibility, ascertainability and predictability of applicable law. Family relations are becoming increasingly complex and diverse due to the frequent and dynamic cross-border movement of persons. If the governing law alters depending on which nationality they hold, where they live or where litigation is instituted, the parties can no longer reasonably foresee the validity and effects of their family relations, constitute rights and obligations, or agree upon disposition of assets. Hence, party autonomy is an appropriate conflicts rule for guaranteeing legal certainty and enhancing the mobility of global and EU citizens. 113 From the viewpoint of conflict of laws order, party autonomy will facilitate international harmony and consistency of applicable law. If the law of the forum state can be chosen, it will particularly serve to circumvent the application of foreign law and reconcile divergent procedural rules in civil law and common law jurisdictions on whether to apply foreign law ex officio or leave it to the parties' pleading and proof. This will, in turn, enhance the integration of the EU. 114 Legislative policy favouring party autonomy will arguably be supported by the trends toward contractualisation and individualisation in substantive family law, which is a corollary of the diversification of family models in society. 115 However, unlike contracts or torts, legal relationships in substantive family law consist of fixed categories and mandatory rules with limited disposition of the parties. Consequently, the eligible laws that can be selected by the parties should reasonably be restricted to the laws that indicate durable and substantive connection, i.e., the law of nationality and habitual residence, and possibly lex fori and/or lex rei sitae. 116 In case of intra-community dual nationality in the EU, all laws of nationality should qualify to be selected, as granting priority to the nationality of the forum state or the effective nationality will run counter to the ECJ rulings in Garcia Avello and Hadadi. 117 Party autonomy in family relations is a recent development. 118 It was first approved for succession in the form of the testator's professio juris and 119 then extended to matrimonial property regimes and lately also to maintenance obligations in proprietary relations, as in domestic conflicts legislations, 120 Hague Conventions, 121 and EU Regulations. 122 Party autonomy appears expedient for the sake of estate planning or the management of assets and pecuniary claims, insofar as necessary protection of weaker parties and third parties is guaranteed. Furthermore, party autonomy is now prescribed in relation to divorce and legal separation as the core principle in the Rome III Regulation, 123 broadening the scope of choice of law compared with some previous domestic legislations. 124 Also for countries like Japan and South Korea that stipulate consensual divorce based on the parties' disposition on dissolution of marriage, 125 it is worth contemplating introducing the parties' choice of law, as has already been done in China. 126 Party autonomy should also be admissible in determining the law governing the first and last name that constitutes personality rights, enabling the person to select the law that best reflects his or her multiple identities. 127 The requirement of the EU law for recognition of a name granted in an EU member state, as understood by the ECJ, 128 can also be appropriately fulfilled by allowing the party to designate the applicable law. 129 On the other hand, with regard to kinship and parental responsibilities, it is crucial to provide necessary protection for children. A choice of law by parents, custodians or guardians has potential risk of leading to an unfavourable law jeopardising the best interests of the child. Even though the state reserves the right to frustrate an inappropriate choice of law that contravenes public policy or human rights, it would be more reasonable to exclude party autonomy from the outset to avoid systematic substantive control of the designated law. 130 As to kinship, it would be expedient to refer to alternative connecting factors in principle to constitute legal parentage in the child's interests. 131 For the sake of effective protection, parental responsibilities and measures for the protection of the child should be governed objectively by the law of the child's habitual residence, which reflects his or her social environment and generally coincides with the forum. 132
Limitations of Party Autonomy
Despite the advantages and importance of party autonomy in contemporary private international family law, it entails certain institutional drawbacks in terms of realising an individual's identity. In the case of matrimonial property regimes or divorce, the spouses need to agree upon the applicable law. If agreement cannot be reached between the spouses due to discordances of their preference, party autonomy would remain ineffective. Furthermore, for the sake of legal certainty, choice of law cannot be granted every time an individual's identity changes, but needs to be subject to a certain time frame. While a child acquires their first and family name at birth following a decision of the custodian parents, it cannot be altered subsequently solely because the child has acquired different identity. 133 What is more important from the viewpoint of global governance is to inquire how to deal with cases in which the individual has affiliation or belonging to an ethnic minority or religious community rather than the state. In these cases, the choice between the law of nationality and that of habitual residence does not reflect the person's identity, given that the conventional conflict of laws method is geared to state law conflicts and disregards conflicts with or among non-state laws. This leads to the question of whether there are any alternative conflict of laws methods that enable to take into account non-state religious, cultural or customary norms.
Interactions between State
Law and Non-State Law
Premises
Viewing the relativity and multiplicity of individual belonging and affiliation, the relevant legal institutions and norms within minorities, religious communities or any collectivities other than the state may be controlling upon individuals. Indeed, family law has particularly become a crucial platform for religious minorities in secular states to define their memberships and demarcate their non-territorial communities. By prescribing marriage, divorce and lineage of their members, religious minorities seek to uphold and unify the group and maintain its values, practices and distinct ways of life. For individuals belonging to such a community and living in its social environment, civil marriage, divorce or paternity authorized by the state may solely have limited meaning. 134 In view of the current challenges of cultural diversity and plurality of legal norms, due regard should be given to interactions between state law and non-state law. 135 In 2008, the District Court of Lille in France rendered a decision that widely attracted attention. 136 In this case, two French Muslims of Moroccan origin celebtrated marriage in France. The husband sought to annul the union after he discovered that his wife was not a virgin, contrary to the tenets of the Islam, and had lied to him on this matter. The judge acceded to his claim and acknowledged serious mistake about the fundamental qualities of his wife (Art. 180 (2) Civil Code), on the grounds that she consented to the claim and knew that her virginity was a decisive factor for her husband to enter marriage. According to leading authors, however, the wife's virginity is not a fundamental quality of the spouse under the present French law, as it does not render marital life impossible or unbearable, unlike impotency or mental disorder. Obligating only the wife retroactively to chastity and fidelity would also run counter to gender equality and dignity of individuals. 137 At the end of the day, the husband's claim was dismissed by the Court of Appeal of Douai. 138 In the underlying case, both spouses were French nationals, so the conditions of marriage were governed by French law (Art. 3 (3) Civil Code). The question was whether and how far Islamic moral concept should be taken into account in interpreting French law. Although the judge at first instance was inclined to take Islamic morality into account, the Court of Appeal ruled that it was not feasible to sublime religious norms into the construction and application of state law. As Malaurie argues, the interpretation of the positive French law was held to depend not on the spouses' intent or the social environment where they live but on the general conscience of the nation. 139 This interplay of state law and non-state law indicates that the phenomena of conflict of laws may well shift from territory-bound cross-border cases to domestic cases, in light of the multiplying sources of legal norms. In fact, the number of third-state immigrants who hold the nationality of the host state is rapidly increasing in Europe. 140 Even if there is no conflict of laws due to a lack of internationality of the case in the traditional sense, there could still be a conflict of norms between state law and non-state religious, cultural or customary divorce. 146 Arguably, the data-theory permits moderate and reasonable interactions between the applicable state law and non-state norms within the framework of the traditional conflict of laws system.
Substantive Law Methods
In view of multicultural aspirations in society, states may also incorporate religious or other non-state norms into their substantive law system. For historical and institutional reasons, Italian law recognises concordat marriage celebrated under Canon law, 147 whereas Spanish and UK laws provide for, inter alia, Islamic and Jewish marriage with civil effects in an effort to accommodate the spouses' faith. 148 Since Islamic law prohibits adoption and only acknowledges kafala, Spain and the UK introduced a corresponding institution of guardianship to protect Muslim children and ensure them stable family relations. 149 The recent German legislation on the circumcision of male infants sought to legalise the established Muslim and Jewish ritual and custom. 150 In these countries, religious family institutions have been transformed and translated into the state legal system for the sake of cultural accommodation and respect for individual identity. On the other hand, states may well have interests in exercising necessary control in an effort to preserve social order and protect vulnerable parties, mostly women and children. In fact, a number of states have adopted special rules to deter or sanction the forced marriage of Muslim women, notably Sweden, 151 Germany, 152 Switzerland, 153 and the UK 154 They have subjected the celebration of marriage under foreign law to a lex fori control, 155 introduced penal sanctions and other regulatory mechanisms or facilitated the annulment of marriages. 156 Jewish divorce is also a good example. Jewish divorce is effected in a ritual where the husband hands in a get, a bill of divorce, to the wife in front of the Rabbinat. If the husband refuses to do so in order to seek retaliation or circumvent maintenance obligations, the wife is bound to the religious marriage forever. Even after obtaining civil divorce, she cannot remarry in Judaism, and her children born from another man are severely disadvantaged. 157 As a remedy for a distressed Jewish wife, the French Cour de cassation ordered the husband to pay damages on ground of abuse of rights in 1972. 158 The New York Court of Appeals took a different tack in 1983. 159 In this Avitzur case, the wife sought to enforce ketubah signed at marriage celebration, under which the husband had promised to appear at Beth Din, a religious tribunal, for advice and consultation on their marriage including the granting of a get. The judge held that the spouses had agreed to refer disputes to a non-judicial forum in ketubah, which is not a religious issue and therefore enforceable under neutral principles of contract law, analogously as a prenuptial agreement. As a result, the husband was ordered by the court to appear before the religious tribunal to fulfil his contractual obligation. 160 Following this decision, the New York legislature adopted the so-called get statute, which stipulates that a spouse needs to take all necessary measures to eliminate any hindrance for the other spouse's remarriage before applying for a divorce in the courts. 161 Although formulated in gender and religion-neutral language, it envisages indirectly obliging a Jewish husband to submit a get to his wife. Comparable statutes have been adopted in Ontario, Canada (1986), 162 South Africa (1996), 163 and the UK (2002). 164 States will regulate family relations and guarantee fundamental rights where necessary, even if doing so set certain restrictions on moral concepts of religious communities and individual identities. Nevertheless, a troubling movement is currently being observed in the USA. By the 2010 amendment of the Oklahoma Constitution, a provision was introduced that banned state courts from considering Shari'a law. Even after it was held unconstitutional in 2013 under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, 165 other state legislatures joined the movement by extending the prohibition to all foreign laws and international law. 166 Such excessive control, partly caused by lack of knowledge or ungrounded fear of Islam, may negatively impact US overseas business transactions and unduly deny the validity of any religious family relations constituted abroad, including Jewish marriages celebrated between US nationals in Israel. 167
Religious Arbitration
The interactions between state law and non-state law examined so far consist in integrating non-state norms into the state law system through appropriate interpretation or substantive legislation. These methods fit into the long-established conflict of laws system and can be accommodated without difficulty. It is, however, a different question whether religious or other non-state norms qualify as the law governing family relations as such. While the choice of non-state law in commercial contracts has gained support to a certain extent, 168 conflicts lawyers have been reluctant to apply the same policy to family relations, in which objective connecting factors have traditionally dominated and the parties' disposition has been limited both in conflict of laws and substantive law. 169 Nevertheless, there have been remarkable attempts to acquiesce autonomy of religious institutions in conducting alternative dispute resolution and recognise their effects in the state. In Ontario, Canada, Shari'a arbitration was introduced in 2004 by the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice to decide family disputes between Muslims. 170 Although there had already been other religious arbitration for Men-nonites, Catholics, Jews and Ismailites, 171 only the Shari'a arbitration polarised public opinion due to fears of Islamic fundamentalism and the oppression of women. Even the legitimacy of the multiculturalism provided for in the Canadian Constitution 172 was queried. 173 The debate eventually came to an end when the Ontario legislature enacted Family Statute Law Amendment Act 2006, requiring all family arbitrations to be conducted in accordance with Canadian law to the exclusion of religious law. 174 As a result, the state primacy has been warranted in regulating family relations and precluding the autonomous decision-making authority of religious institutions in arbitration. 175 To maintain state regulation, Ontario took an all-ornothing approach, eliminating all religious arbitrations as competing normative systems. 176 Religious tribunals, however, could indeed afford better protection to women than state courts in certain circumstances, as in the case of Islamic mediation in the UK. In Islamic law, divorce is unilaterally effected by the husband's talaq pronunciation in principle. Muslim women who have obtained a civil divorce but have failed to persuade their husbands to declare talaq, or who have only celebrated an Islamic marriage and cannot seek civil divorce at state courts often refer to mediation at Islamic councils in the UK. For many devout Muslim women, mediation within the religious community is the only viable path to being released from religious marriage, even if this is lacking in coercive measures and gender equality. 177 In this respect, the faith-based tribunals are capable of complementing the state legal system without substituting it. For the sake of shared responsibility, Shachar advocates regulated interaction between state and religion, providing the religious institutions with submatter jurisdiction in arbitration, while reserving the regulatory authority of the state to exercise ex ante control and ex post judicial review. 178 If one could carefully depart from the premise that state is able to provide necessary control and put appropriate constraints, it would presumably be worth contemplating institutionalising alternative dispute resolution of religious communities. The conventional dichotomy between state and religion could eventually be mitigated, even though
